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An analysis of Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) Depot Level Maintenance is 
conducted to examine the scheduled maintenance cycle and processes in order to 
determine potential inefficiencies related to cost or time.  Performance is measured by 
analyzing costs, cycle time, quality, availability, and flexibility.  Current operations in 
Iraq are considered for effects on depot level maintenance, depot capacity, and 
operational availability.  This analysis has implications in determining whether depot 
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 Currently, depot level (up to fifth echelon) maintenance for the Light Armored 
Vehicle (LAV) is performed at Maintenance Centers (MC) located at Marine Corps 
Logistics Base (MCLB) Albany, Georgia and MCLB Barstow, California. The MC’s 
work for the Commanding General of Marine Corps Logistics Command (LOGCOM) 
headquartered at MCLB Albany.  The mission of the LOGCOM is to provide worldwide, 
integrated logistics/supply chain and distribution management, depot level maintenance 
management, and strategic prepositioning capability in support of the operating forces 
and other supported units to maximize their readiness and sustainability and to support 
enterprise and program level total life cycle management.  The MC’s are at the core of 
the LOGCOM mission.   
 Each MC provides multi-commodity depot level maintenance capabilities for 
similar ground combat and ground combat support equipment for units within their 
geographical regions.  Generally speaking, MCLB Albany supports units in the eastern 
half of the United States, while MCLB Barstow supports units in the western half of the 
country, including units in Hawaii and Okinawa, Japan.  LAV’s returning from combat 
operations, and scheduled for depot level maintenance, are offloaded at Blount Island 
Command (BIC) in Jacksonville, Florida and sent to either Albany or Barstow, depending 
upon the available capacity at each maintenance center.   
   Personnel strength aboard the two logistics bases is composed of 661 Marines in 
Albany and 198 in Barstow, 1566 civilian employees in Albany and 1005 in Barstow, and 
197 contractors in Albany and 95 in Barstow.  The total number of support personnel 
aboard each logistics base do not all work directly in the MC’s, but do provide support at 
some level.   
 The multi-commodity capability of each MC at both bases provides an 
infrastructure capable of supporting a wide variety of equipment, weapon systems, and 
components.  Each MC has the ability to rapidly shift work from one equipment line to 
another to meet changing priorities.  Because the processes are basically the same at each 
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maintenance center for each piece of equipment, there are duplicate maintenance 
functions performed at each base, which gives the Marine Corps flexibility for overflow 
capacity when operational tempo is high.   
 There are six different variants of the LAV; the Command and Control (LAV-C2) 
variant, the Logistics (LAV-Log) variant, the Mortar (LAV-M) variant, the Recovery 
(LAV-R) variant, the Anti-Tank (LAV-AT), and the 25 millimeter chain gun (LAV-25), 
which is the primary LAV that makes up the predominant number of LAV’s in the 
Marine Corps’ inventory.  The hull for each variant is very similar, differing mainly with 
the weapons systems for the LAV-25, the LAV-M, the LAV-AT and the support 
components for the LAV-R, the LAV-Log, and the LAV-C2 with its communications 
equipment. 
 
B.   PURPOSE OF ANALYSIS 
 The purpose of our research is to provide an overall analysis of the depot level 
maintenance processes for the LAV.  It is our intent to provide clarification of the depot 
maintenance processes for the end users in the operational forces to better understand the 
importance of the depots role in driving readiness; particularly in the case of the aging 
LAV fleet.  Specifically, we address maintenance costs and Direct Labor Hours (DLH) 
costs to make a comparison between the depots in Albany and Barstow.  Additionally, we 
address how the depots’ have incorporated the Theory of Constraints (TOC) to 
significantly reduce Repair Cycle Times (RCT) and show how the efficient use of the 
depots has reduced ownership costs and extended the useful life of the LAV.  Factors that 
are harder to quantify, such as operational tempo’s effect on depot capacity, risk 
associated with single siting maintenance, and the effect that budgetary constraints have 
on scheduling maintenance will be addressed.   
 
C. SCOPE OF ANALYSIS 
 There are 398 LAV-25’s in the Marine Corps inventory, comprising 54% of the 
total number of vehicles on hand.  Therefore, we will limit the scope of our research to 
the LAV-25 variant in order to capture the “big picture” of the depot maintenance 
processes.  The LAV-25 maintenance costs and labor costs show trends that are similar to 
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the other five variants.  Our research will not be based on the Base Realignment and 
Closure (BRAC) or any other political factors, which may affect the depots.  It must be 
noted that the entire data gathering, related to costs and cycle times, for both MC’s was 
done through LOGCOM, which commands both MC’s and maintains cost and 
maintenance data for both depots.  A site visit was conducted at Maintenance Center 
Albany (MCA), but not at Maintenance Center Barstow (MCB). 
 
D. METHODOLOGY 
 The Inspect and Repair Only As Necessary (IROAN) Program is used as the basis 
for our research.  Historically the IROAN Program has accounted for over 90% of the 
depot maintenance requirements for the LAV.  The IROAN Program has the longest 
history, the most in-depth maintenance practices, and it will be at the center of our 
analysis.  The Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) Program and the battle damaged 
vehicles from Iraq will be incorporated in our analysis in regards to costs and cycle times 
at both MC’s and how both have affected the IROAN Program short-term.   
 First, we analyze how incorporating the Theory of Constraints (TOC) has 
significantly reduced LAV depot maintenance cycle times.  We discuss what new 
practices were incorporated in FY02 and how those practices reduced average 
maintenance cycle times for all variants of LAV’s.  
 Costs of depot maintenance are analyzed in depth at both MC’s from FY01 
through FY05.  We break down LAV-25 costs at each MC by Direct Labor Hours (DLH) 
costs and material costs per LAV-25.  We then compare DLH and material costs per 
LAV between the two MC’s and analyze the differences in these costs.  In addition we 
analyze the differences in DLH’s per LAV between the two MC’s and how these 
differences have produced significant disparity in average DLH costs between Barstow 
and Albany.  We then examine factors which have affected maintenance and labor costs 
at both MC’s, including the introduction of the Theory of Constraints (TOC), Lean 
Thinking, the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP), current operations in Iraq, budget 
constraints, and training new personnel.  In addition, transportation costs are also 
analyzed from the operating units to both MC’s. 
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 Next, we analyze the Repair Cycle Times (RCT) of the LAV-25 at Maintenance 
Center Albany (MCA).  Each maintenance step for the IROAN and SLEP Programs is 
detailed, with the corresponding time to conduct the maintenance step, in order to arrive 
at the RCT.  Some LAV-25’s scheduled for IROAN maintenance have already had the 
SLEP upgrades, but others have not.  Detailed information regarding the IROAN and 
SLEP programs is outlined in the Maintenance Processes chapter.  The LAV-25’s 
without the SLEP upgrades have them installed in conjunction with scheduled IROAN 
maintenance and the differences in RCT’s between the two processes is analyzed in the 
Repair Cycle Times chapter.  Differences in RCT’s between the two MC’s are also 
analyzed to determine where inefficiencies exist.  In addition, we will use Operational 
Availability (Ao) calculations to estimate required Mean Time Between Maintenance 
(MTBM) for LAV variants based on the current expected vehicle distribution between 
using units and vehicles in the depot level maintenance (DLM) cycle process.   
 Lastly, based on our analysis, assumptions are made about the existing 
inefficiencies and we make recommendations on what we feel can positively affect the 
depot level maintenance processes at both MC’s.  Consideration for consolidating depot 
level maintenance functions and personnel reductions are strategic decisions based on 
political, financial, operational, and logistical factors beyond the scope of our research.  
Therefore, we do not make a specific recommendation as to which depot would be the 
best for consolidating LAV depot maintenance or that consolidation would even result in 











II. THEORY OF CONSTRAINTS 
A. MAINTENANCE CENTERS  
 The feat for which Maintenance Center Albany (MCA) and Maintenance Center 
Barstow (MCB) personnel are most proud of over the last few years is the 
implementation of the Theory of Constraints (TOC) and Lean Thinking into the Depot 
Level Maintenance Process (DLMP).  In analyzing the impact of TOC on costs and 
RCT’s since the system went online formally in late 2002, it’s also important to 
understand the impact on the process and the rationale in moving the LAV’s from an 
assembly line process to a workstation process. 
 The assembly line process used prior to implementation of the TOC meant that 
although an LAV was not actually on top of a conveyor belt moving along a restricted 
line, maintenance personnel still were directed to perform maintenance in a more 
sequential manner.  The obvious concern in this type of system is the impact of 
bottlenecks and unforeseen issues arising with an individual vehicle.  Ultimately, this 
process held RCT’s high at an average of over 180 days.  For example, when a vehicle 
hull needed welding, the assembly line process could not react well in keeping RCT’s 
under control. 
1.  Contract Consulting 
 MCA and MCB contracted with Vector Strategies (VS) in assisting with 
implementation of TOC.  The most important consideration that VS had to give MCA 
and MCB was the fact that as a government agency and not a for-profit private firm, 
MCA and MCB required a TOC and Lean Thinking system tailored to its unique needs.  
Each of the facets of TOC as they have been developed more fully since 1984 when Eli 
Goldratt wrote “The Goal” were considered in the MCA/MCB process.  However, not all 
of them were prudent for the government agency.  But looking back even further, why 
TOC? 
2.  Concept 
 The leadership at MCA/MCB knew that it had to gain and maintain the upper 
hand on information flowing into and out of the DLM program, and to learn how to best 
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utilize the available information to improve processes and RCT.  A central concept of 
TOC is a basic understanding of cause and effect.  Understanding how and why things 
happen around you, from the maintenance personnel and supervisors to the highest levels 
of the hierarchy, is an essential element in any attempt at improvement.  This Thinking 
Process has given MCA/MCB a foundation in that it provides them the ability to 
recognize paradigm shifts as times change, without changing the assumptions and rules 
within the organization.   
 TOC typically consists of three parts: 
1.   A set of problem solving tools-called the Thinking Processes (TP)-to 
logically and systematically answer the questions, “What to change? What 
to change to?  How to effect the change?” 
2.   A set of daily management tools from the TP’s that can be used to 
improve vital skills such as communication, effecting change, team 
building, and empowerment. 
3.   Solutions created by applying the TP to areas like production, distribution, 
marketing, project management, direction setting, etc. 
3.  Goals 
 Goals of the maintenance center (MC) included meeting requirements for cost, 
schedule, and quality, increasing throughput, decreasing costs, decreasing WIP, and 
reducing RCT’s.  Vector Strategies and MCA/MCB examined each of the above 
possibilities in determining the potential for improvement within the processes of 
maintenance centers. The first thing they did was to establish the overarching strategy by 
which everyone could focus on a process and improve it.  This 5 step process consists of: 
1.   Identify the constraint 
2.   Exploit the constraint 
3.   Subordinate everything to the constraint 
4.   Elevate the constraint 
5.  Return to Step 1.  Do not let inertia set in! 
 The two scheduling methodologies that they focused on were the Critical Chain 
and the Simplified Drum-Buffer-Rope.  In the Critical Chain the PM plans for the known 
and buffers for the unknown, especially with regards to major end items (a core  
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competency of the MC’S).  The S-DBR is used for component management and uses 
buffers to schedule components to be completed in time for installation with the Critical 
Chain. 
 At this point two of the most important concepts to understand are the scheduling 
and the sub-assembly processes of the LAV.  The MC’S is unique in adopting this newer 
scheduling concept in which the most important date to the supervisor is the date 
promised, or the end-date.  The RCT for the LAV-25 is currently on a 120 day schedule.  
In order to maintain the flow, workload, budget, etc. within the MC, a vehicle may not 
have work started on it for some time after induction into the maintenance cycle; 
sometimes as long as three weeks.  None-the-less, vehicles rarely exceed the RCT of 120 
days.  This is due in part to the fact that components stripped from an LAV hull, whether 
it be the turret, engine, or transmission, rarely are remanufactured or repaired and then 
reinstalled back on the same hull from which they were pulled.  Therefore the throughput 
of the sub-assembly processes instantly became candidates for the constraints addressed 
by TOC.  
 
B.  LEAN PROCESS 
 Lean Thinking was a key element in the transformation.  The tenets of thinking 
Lean are many, and where the possibility for adherence to the concepts was practical, the 
tenets were put into place.  5-S/Visual, TPM, VSM, flow, Kaizen, Kanban (pull), were 
the primary focus for thinking lean, and are all addressed here. 
  The process of creating workplace cleanliness and organization for the sake of 
creating greater efficiency and visual and psychological satisfaction was implemented.  
To the 5-S’s of Sort, Straighten, Scrub, Standardize, and Sustain, MCA added the 6th S of 
Safety to lay the foundation.  The MC’S proudly displays both before and after 
photographs of the work-bays in advertising its successes.  
1.  Total Productive Maintenance 
 Total Productive Maintenance (TPM) is the systematic process for optimizing 
overall equipment effectiveness by minimizing the unavailability of required machinery.  
The relationship between maintenance personnel, supervisors, and internal distributors, 
and the delineation of tasks, was a key element for the MC’S in improving efficiency.  
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The maintenance of tools and equipment, attempts at reducing costs, and taking advice 
from the maintenance personnel and operators so that the PM could work with the 
contractors and acquisitions specialists in improving the reliability and capabilities of the 
LAV were key factors.  One small but life-saving example of this included the production 
of a modification that reinforced the “bullet proof” peep holes so that in the event of an 
external blast, the small windows would not disconnect from the hull and injure crew 
members, as they had in the past. 
2.  Value Stream Mapping 
 Value Stream Mapping(VSM) helped the MC’S reduce the non-value added 
activities, or waste, that was plaguing the RCT’s.  Some of these efforts tied directly to 
the 6-S’s in that the seeming organization created by having inventories an arms length 
away from the maintenance personnel were often merely creating inefficiencies.  
Additionally, many inefficiencies were inevitable based on the original design of the 
LAV’s.  The variability in length and width of an LAV hull can be more than one inch 
because they were manufactured with a craftsman concept over two decades ago.  
Consequently attempts at standardizing many remanufacturing processes at the depot 
level created many problems for the assembly line maintenance processes.  Much of this 
waste was reduced by moving to the team concept in which a group of workers now 
spends approximately 21 days on a vehicle together in the reassembly process.  They 
quickly learn the intricacies of the skeleton hull dropped into their work-station, and work 
accordingly. 
3.  Process Flow 
 Flow processes of similar operations were consolidated in order to eliminate 
waste, and this was important in transforming the assembly line process into the work-
station concept.  Flow issues tie directly to the VSM issues addressed above.  The end 
result being a strong adherence to the promised RCT, the improvement in quality since 
everything fits together better than it did after an assembly line LAV was completed, and 




 The real empowerment of the maintenance personnel came with Kaizen, and they 
actually use this distinctly Japanese term at the MC’S.  The workers were trained to 
identify and eliminate wasteful activities in an effort to continually improve the system.  
Along with witnessing many of the above lean concepts in action during our tour of 
MCA, we did observe the ritualistic team meeting with the supervisor prior to 
commencement on the days work.  This was an opportunity for communication to move 
both vertically and horizontally, for team members to share tips among one another and 
bring up issues to the supervisor, and for the supervisor to delineate shifts in taskings and 
hold workers accountable for progress.  The implementation of Kaizen at the MC’S has 
improved quality, very much through information sharing, reduced costs by maintaining 
minimizing variability and staying on budget, and held the MC’S to its advertised RCT’s. 
 The natural system shift that went along foundationally with the above tenets was 
the shift to more of a pull system using Kanban.  The disassembly and reassembly 
processes were linked closely with the sub-assembly processes.  This has allowed the 6-
S’s to maintain the cleanliness, shine, and safety in the work-bays by keeping inventories 
on hand minimal.  The pull system also works hand in hand with Kaizen as 
communication flow increased drastically, and with the flow processes and VSM as 
schedules are mapped out and adjusted incrementally to accommodate the progress on a 
particular LAV.  For example, when a hull is ready for specific steps in the reassembly 
process, this is communicated to the LAV component warehouse in which the parts are 
gathered into a container and then delivered via forklift directly to the requesting 
workstation.   
 We also must remember that this type of system makes sense for the MC because 
of the fact that parts pulled off of an LAV hull during disassembly are not likely to be the 
ones reinstalled on the hull during reassembly.  This flexibility is beneficial to keeping 
RCT’s down as they pertain to the LAV proper, but does little for the sub-assembly 
processes since they work predominantly on a first come first basis in which components 
requiring extensive rework are subject to the constraints imposed by the Marine Corps 
supply system.  Ultimately, although this pull, or Kanban, system has reduced inventory 
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in the workbays and has arguably helped to maintain output schedules, it is difficult to 
attribute a dollar amount or even a percentage when trying to estimate the improvement. 
4.  Setup Reduction and Six Sigma 
 Other lean concepts that found some practical application in the LAV 
maintenance process are Setup Reduction and Six Sigma.  The reduction in changeover 
time from the last good piece of the previous run to the first good piece of the next run is 
normally found to be more applicable to a production line.  However, many of the 
components of the LAV rely on internally manufactured sub-components.  These 
machine tools are computer controlled and operate as water jet cutters, lathes, punch 
presses, and grinders, among others.  By optimizing the batch sizes produced at this level, 
the MC has realized reduced inventories, greater organization capabilities through the 6-
S’s, and reduced costs.  It is within these sub-assembly processes, like the hydraulics and 
suspension section or the hull repair section that the Setup Reduction practices have 
proven beneficial.   
 The quality issues faced at the MC’S were improved through many of the tenets 
discussed above, to include tenets from Six Sigma.  The structured approach to 
identifying and eliminating quality problems that this method helped with are often 
considered applicable to only a manufacturing environment and not the remanufacturing 
environment at the MC’S.  However, just like the Setup Reduction concepts were applied 
at the sub-assembly process level, Six Sigma concepts have been used to increase quality 
and employee involvement through team participation, which has reduced the cost of 
maintaining quality standards and increased capacity.   
 Parallel to the implementation of the TOC, one of the keys to maintaining 
oversight of the program lay in maintenance centers’ (MC) adoption of the PM concept.  
Knowing that mid-level management concepts could reap much greater rewards through 
an empowered supervisor, the PM system was adopted.  The floor supervisors report 
directly to the LAV PM.  This individual not only has a sole focus on the LAV 
maintenance program, and reports directly to the MC Commander regularly on progress 
and cost issues, but also works closely with contractors in incorporating modifications to 
the LAV as requirements and deficiencies have developed due to the extremely high 
operational tempo imposed on the vehicles during OIF.  For example, once a requirement 
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to reinforce the crew’s small sight windows was identified in order to prevent them from 
coming off during a blast, the PM worked closely with contractors to design a simple 
cage to strengthen and reinforce the shatter-proof windows.  This particular modification 
has already proven itself worthy of taking the impact of a nearby blast without putting the 
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III.  THE MAINTENANCE PROCESSES 
A. INSPECT AND REPAIR ONLY AS NECESSARY PROGRAM 
 The Inspect Repair Only as Necessary (IROAN) Program is a life cycle 
management program that provides depot level maintenance for ground combat 
equipment at scheduled intervals throughout the life cycle.  The purpose of the IROAN 
Program is to conduct a complete inspection and testing of a piece of ground combat 
equipment within guidelines established by a Statement of Work (SOW) and to make any 
necessary repairs found during the inspection.  The IROAN maintenance technique 
determines the extent of work to be done, any repair parts required, and thus, minimizes 
disassembly parts replacement.  The SOW specifies the work required and specifically 
the inspections to be performed, which parts will be replaced, which parts will be rebuilt, 
and which parts will be repaired.  LAV repairs, as dictated by the SOW, may range from 
repairing entire sections of the hull, to secondary repairables like the engine and 
transmission, to consumable class IX repair parts. 
1.  Schedule 
 Scheduling LAV IROAN maintenance is based on multiple factors.  There are 
three primary determinates that currently determine the Mean Time Between IROAN 
Maintenance (MTBMiroan).  The first determinate is 2,000 hours of operation, the second 
is 25,000 miles, and the third is 6 years since the last scheduled depot maintenance.  Only 
one of these three determinates are required for an LAV to be scheduled for depot level 
maintenance and given the high operational tempo of the operating forces it is highly 
unlikely that an LAV will go 6 years between scheduled maintenance.  Additional factors 
that effect annual scheduling include capacity of the two depots, operational 
commitments that affect LAV usage, and funding constraints.   
 The Program Manager (PM), located in Warren, Michigan, is responsible for 
determining annual LAV depot level maintenance requirements, requesting funds for 
those maintenance requirements, and scheduling the workload within once the annual 
budget has been determined.  The PM has to balance the annual maintenance 
requirements within budgetary constraints that are often out of his/her control.  Once the 
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final number of LAV’s is determined for the next Fiscal Year (FY), the forecasted annual 
workload is reflected on the Master Work Schedule (MWS) that shows the number of 
each variant that are scheduled for maintenance at each depot.  The MWS also reflects 
required delivery dates that enable each depot to control workflows and prevent queues 
or gaps from developing in the maintenance centers.   
 LAV’s are sent to the Fleet Support Division (FSD) once they arrive at either 
depot.  If the maintenance center is not ready to induct the LAV into the maintenance 
cycle, it sits in a queue at the FSD.  The following maintenance functions compose the 
different phases of the IROAN for all LAV variants: 
x Phase I – Limited Technical Inspection (LTI)  
1. MC conducts joint LTI with contractor and compares it to LTI 
conducted by the using unit prior to shipment. 
x Phase II – IROAN 
1. Disassembly, clean, and blast hull. 
2. Inspect and repair hull. 
3. Inspect and repair/replace necessary parts. 
4. Prime hull, reassemble, and paint. 
5. Install communications equipment, optics, and small arms. 
x Phase III – Inspection, Testing, and Acceptance 
1. Inspection by the MC. 
2. Testing conducted by the contractor to include road and chassis 
test. 
3. Correction of deficiencies.  
4. Final testing and acceptance. 
x Phase IV – Packaging, Handling, Storage, and Transportation 
1. Vehicle is preserved, packaged, and prepared for transportation 
back to a using unit by the FSD. 
Immediately following completion of the maintenance cycle the LAV’s are returned to 
the FSD where they remain in the queue awaiting transportation back to an operating 
unit.   
 The Marine Corps’ policy is to ensure unit readiness is maintained at the highest 
level possible while the LAV’s are undergoing depot level maintenance.  LAV’s are not 
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scheduled to return to the same using unit that they originated from, but ideally a using 
unit conducts a one-for-one exchange with the depot when an LAV is sent to the depot 
for IROAN.  In order to ensure availability, the depots each maintain a Depot 
Maintenance Float Allowance (DMFA) pool that provide a quantity of LAV variants that 
have undergone IROAN maintenance and are ready for issue.  High operational tempo 
and combat damage to vehicles has made the DMFA pool difficult to maintain and 
operating units may be Table of Equipment (T/E) deficient until the depots can provide a 
replacement vehicle. 
 
B. SERVICE LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM 
 The LAV Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) will ensure that the LAV’s 
combat capabilities will be preserved through 2015, although a replacement platform is 
not scheduled for fielding until 2025.  Most of the 730 plus LAV’s in operation today 
have been in service since the early 1980’s and are nearing the end of their serviceable 
life.  The LAV’s are becoming maintenance intensive, corroding, lack sufficient armor, 
the weapons systems are outdated, and they don’t have adequate communications 
equipment to meet the current fast-paced demands of the modern battlefield.  The goal of 
the SLEP is to improve survivability, sustainability, maintainability, and lethality through 
the following upgrades: 
x Corrosion Control Upgrades 
x Control Panel and Electronic Upgrades: 
1. Modify the Power Distribution Assembly (PDA) 
2. Modify the Control Display Assembly (CDA) 
3. Modify the Gun Control Unit (GCU) 
x Tire/Wheel Replacement: 
o Split wheel design to facilitate maintainability 
o A more reliable and robust tire 




x Hull modifications: 
o Install standoffs 
o Install brackets 
o Install bosses 
 The SLEP modifications and upgrades are conducted in conjunction with the 
IROAN program when the LAV’s go to the depots for scheduled maintenance and add 
very little maintenance time to the entire process.  According to the MC, SLEP upgrades 
and modifications add no more than 14-15 hours of additional work to the RCT.  The 
remainder of the upgrades are done during reassembly process with no addition man-
hours because the MC’s are installing the SLEP components provided instead of the old 
baseline components.  Currently, incorporating the SLEP upgrades is not adding 
additional time to the IROAN RCT’s and is expected to reduce the RCT’s and 
maintenance costs as the SLEP’d vehicles rotate back to the depots in their scheduled 
IROAN maintenance cycle.   
 The SLEP Program was initiated in late FY03 and is scheduled to be completed in 
FY06.  The SLEP upgrades should slow the rapidly growing supportability costs and 
improve the effectiveness of the Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) Battalions that 
use the LAV.  Improved operational availability and maintainability are expected as a 
result of the SLEP Program. 
 
C. MAINTENANCE CENTER CAPACITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE  
 The maintenance centers base their capacities on the Department of Defense 
(DoD) Directive 4151.18 definition that states that capacity is “an indicator, expressed in 
Direct Labor Hours (DLH), required by a shop or depot to support funded workload 
requirements and provide essential core capabilities.”  Both maintenance centers 
calculate DLH by production shop categories that include the same type of weapons 
systems.  The LAV is classified as a ground combat vehicle as are Amphibious Assault 
Vehicles and the M1A1 Abrams Tank.  Both maintenance centers have enormous 
capacity that is not currently being fully utilized.  MCA stated that they have the capacity 
to conduct all the depot level maintenance for the entire fleet of LAV’s.  It is likely that 
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both MC’s could each handle the entire LAV fleet because of their ability to shift 
capacity from one production line to another as maintenance requirements change.  The 
multi-commodity capability gives the MC’s tremendous flexibility and both can respond 
rapidly to a surge in maintenance demand. 
1.  Infrastructure 
 The infrastructure of both MC’s is composed of the facilities, diagnostic 
equipment, tools, and technology that are required to conduct depot maintenance of the 
LAV and its weapons systems.  Both MC’s have nearly the same processes, but two 
differing processes must be noted.  MCA uses a static four axle chassis dynamometer that 
tests the components of the drive train, while MCB uses a mobile, towed chassis 
dynamometer.  MCA uses a live-fire facility to test the 25 millimeter chain gun on the 
LAV-25, while MCB uses a dry-cycle fire test that cycles inert ammunition through the 
gun to test for specific load capacity and cycling rates. 
 
D. INVENTORY AND SECONDARY REPAIR PARTS 
 Class IX repair part inventory policies are established at both MC’s by Material 
Control Centers (MCC) that are responsible for overall centralized planning and 
management of repair parts.  MCC responsibilities include material requirement 
determination, procurement, requisitioning, receipt, and inventory accountability of Class 
IX consumable repair parts.  Production and material planners determine replacement 
factor rates for each component in order to arrive at a washout rate that management can 
use for forecasting.  The SOW details the work requirements to be performed and 
management can then use the LAV maintenance schedule to determine daily usage rates, 
reorder points, and the amount of safety stock to be maintained. 
 Secondary Repairables (SECREPS) are components designated as repairable, 
when it is determined that it is more economical and timely to repair them than purchase 
replacements.  SecReps are broken down into two categories: Field Level Repairables 
(FLR) and Depot Level Repairables (DLR).  FLR’s are repairables that can be repaired at 
supporting Combat Service Support organizations that possess third and fourth echelon 
maintenance capability.  DLR’s are SecReps requiring depot level repair beyond the 
maintenance capability of the Combat Service Support organizations.   
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 The SecRep Program at each MC exists to provide a source of serviceable 
repairables to support the operating forces.  Each MC possesses maintenance capabilities 
to repair LAV SecReps as well as an inventory of SecReps as safety stock to support 
operational units within their geographical region.  Both MC DLR assets are managed by 
a centralized inventory manager that is located at MCLB, Albany.  Initial inventory levels 
of SecReps were determined by LOGCOM during the provisioning process and 
allowance changes can be made semiannually based on actual usage data consisting of 




IV.  COST ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW 
 The financial impact of the War on Terror on budgeting at the depots has been 
significant.  Increases over the budgeting rates pre 911 have put the Service Life 
Extension Program (SLEP) and Inspect and Repair Only As Necessary (IROAN) 
processes for the LAV’s on the fast-track.  However, with the drastic increase in the 
tempo of operations overseas, especially as companies of LAV’s patrol the Iraqi borders 
daily, the financial influx may be stressed to maintain the vehicles as they require depot 
level maintenance (DLM) much more often now than they did before Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF).   
 Four major differences from today were in effect in FY01 and at least part of 
FY02 that very much impacted the ability of the maintenance centers to perform IROAN.  
This was prior to the implementation of the Theory of Constraints on an extremely 
stringent and insufficient budget and prior to the incorporation of the SLEP program.  
Additionally this period operated using the assembly-line process and not the 
team/craftsman concept discussed in the TOC chapter.  Each of these factors impacted 
the DLM process in different ways.  Whether the impacts have been positive or negative 
over time and to-date are examined here. 
 The fiscal constraints prior to 911 were arguably more than a little constrictive.  
With a total of 732 LAV’s on-hand, the IROAN total for FY01 was limited to 37 for both 
depots combined.  With a maximum time allowed between IROAN’s of six years, at that 
rate only 222 LAV’s would receive the necessary DLM, or less than one-third.  FY02 
was not significantly better though with only 59 LAV’s IROAN’d, at a rate of nearly one-
half of the required rate.  It must be remembered at this point that these numbers are prior 
to the severely increased operational tempo created by OIF, and this will be addressed 
later. 
When interpreting the figures and tables throughout this section, it is essential to 
understand what costs they reflect, and what costs they do not.  In compiling data, we 
focused on IROAN’s and IROAN/SLEP combinations, but never SLEP cost data alone.  
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This was because our focus is on IROAN’s.  Once the vehicle is SLEP’d and becomes 
and is then identified by the A1 addition to its nomenclature, its IROAN’s include the 
components added or upgraded during the SLEP.  Additionally, we consider the SLEP by 
itself to have an insignificant impact in terms of additional cost and time.  Therefore the 
charts show LAV’s that were IROAN’d, whether they were previously SLEP’d or not, 
and show combination IROAN/SLEP’s.     
 In the tables listed below, the columns reflect six aspects of cost over time that we 
deemed essential for our analysis.  Five of the column headings pertain to the average 
cost of the particular heading per each vehicle serviced.  LAV’s IROAN&SLEP reflects 
total vehicles serviced as explained in the previous paragraph.  LHR’s refers to the 
average number of total Labor Hours per vehicle.  Labor Dollars reflects the average cost 
per vehicle as allocated in the cost allocation per task charts displayed in Appendices A 
and B.  Average LHR Cost reflects the average cost per labor hour per vehicle and is 
determined by dividing Labor Dollars by LHR’s.  Materials reflect the average cost per 
vehicle of material resources used in performing the IROAN or IROAN/SLEP 
combination.  The last column, Each, reflects average total cost of each vehicle and sums 
the cost of Labor Dollars and Materials to get the total. 
 
B.   TRENDS FOR ALL VARIANTS 
 Before examining LAV-25’s specifically, it is worthwhile to briefly list the 
overall changes in cost for all of the variants combined with regards to labor hours, 
average LHR cost, material cost, and total cost each.  These measures will prove to be the 
most prudent in analyzing costs.  These numbers are a compilation of the data provided 
by LOGCOM in Albany.  The original cost data was input into an Excel spreadsheet in 
order to model costs over time and across geographical regions in contrasting MCA with 
MCB.  When necessary the averages were weighted in compiling over time and in 
comparing the two MC’s.  The data reflects the combined cost of performing an IROAN 
and SLEP as the two separate processes became combined in late FY03.  The cost of 
performing a SLEP exclusively will not be analyzed, but will be considered for its affects 
on total costs.  Figure 1 pertains to all LAV variants and reflects the average total cost of 
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each LAV receiving an IROAN or IROAN/SLEP, and the graph is broken down further 
to show the impact of both labor and materials on the average total cost. 
  















Figure 1.   LAV IRON/SLEP Cost Trends 
 
 An often ignored factor that reduces the ability of the MC’s to perform DLM is 
the perception of unit commanders.  Even though the LAV program maintains the Depot 
Maintenance Float Allowance (DMFA) in which a one for one swap of LAV’s is 
conducted upon the arrival at the MC of the vehicle to be inducted, any significant 
change in the expected number of vehicles to be shipped away from the unit can very 
easily be met with resistance by the using unit.  Whether it is the established training 
schedule, a crewman’s affinity for a particular vehicle, or the dozens of man-hours of 
preparation required to get an LAV ready for shipment to a depot, there is often a 
struggle to get units to follow new schedules when higher authority has increased 
induction rates.  However, this has not affected the total number of LAV’s IROAN’d 
even considering potential commander inhibitions. 
 Table 1 delineates the average costs per vehicle over time for all variants per the 
column headings addressed in the Cost Analysis Overview.  The weighted average LHR 
cost since FY01 has increased modestly from $75 to $85, or 13%.  Material costs have 
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risen more dramatically though from $99K to $134K per vehicle, or 35%.  Finally, the 
total cost per vehicle has increased from $301K to $417K, or 38%.  The LAV-25 alone 
reflects these overall trends in cost, and focusing on this single variant will in no way 
detract from an analysis of all variants.  At this juncture, it must be remembered that 








LHR Cost Materials Each 
FY01 37 2,687 202,534 75 99,110 301,644
FY02 59 2,979 222,379 75 97,192 319,571
FY03 119 3,534 273,358 77 124,942 398,300
FY04 60 3,030 244,553 80 112,525 357,079
FY05 152 3,309 283,223 85 134,249 417,472
 
Table 1.   Average Costs Per Vehicle  FY01 – 05 ( All Variants) 
 
C.   THE LAV-25 
 As seen below in the Table 2, the LAV-25’s are reflective of all variants 
combined, at least from FY02-05.  The disparity in the FY01 data is reflective of a single 
piece of data for MCB, which shows that zero LAV-25’s were IROAN’d that year.  
Therefore, the LAV-25 cost analysis will pertain to the years of FY02-05.  This time 
period captures both old and new processes, and old and new budget issues pertaining to 
the IROAN and SLEP programs.  From FY02 through FY05, the weighted average LHR 
cost increased 17%.  Material costs increased 39% during the same period.  Finally, the 







LHR Cost Materials Each 
FY01 3 3,523 283,937 81 109,209 393,146
FY02 33 3,135 235,714 75 94,749 330,464
FY03 79 3,766 291,687 78 136,004 427,691
FY04 27 3,202 258,320 80 114,102 372,422
FY05 73 3,340 296,110 88 131,551 427,660
 
Table 2.   2 Average LHR and Labor Cost FY 01 – 05 (LAV – 25) 
 
1.   Labor Hours and Personnel 
 The effects of budget increases are not always all positive.  The ability to IROAN 
additional LAV’s in a single year must be weighed against many factors.  One factor is in 
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the physical capacity to perform the additional work vis-à-vis labor requirements.  An 
increased budget does not alone provide the capability to increase output. 
 As delineated in Table 2, labor hours saw a significant jump in FY03 before 
settling back down in FY04-05.  The depots saw an average increase of over 600 LHR’s 
required per vehicle completed, which was about a 20% increase.  But the potential 
rationale for this includes the newly introduced TOC process, the shift to the teams and 
the craftsman concept, and the large number of less experienced workers.  Distinguishing 
specifically between the effects of these three factors is a challenge, so they are analyzed 
together here.  With any newly introduced program, the learning curve may be rapid, but 
the initial impact is usually very noticeable on bottom lines as is the case here.  The 
significant training required in the transition to TOC would have easily extended LHR’s 
as personnel learned their new system of empowerment and teamwork, on top of the 
additional training required to become an efficient and effective worker in the new 
process.  Figure 2 demonstrates the effects of average labor and material costs on average 
total costs of the LAV-25 exclusively over time. 
 















Figure 2.   LAV-25 IROAN/SLEP Cost Trends 
 
 Although we are not 100% certain of how the MC’s filled the gaps with new 
personnel, we believe that most if not all of the labor gaps were filled by current 
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employees.  If necessary, the second means would have been the hiring of new workers, 
only because contracting out the work done in the IROAN process would not have been 
prudent fiscally or otherwise.  Either way, the addition of less experienced workers into 
the new LAV IROAN process would surely have an impact, and help to explain in part 
the nearly 15% increase in LHR’s between FY02-03.   
 The impact on LHR’s of more than doubling the number of LAV’s IROAN’d in 
FY03 might be expected to be profound.  The MC’s have a few methods to decide 
between when a need for additional labor arises.  First, they can hire new people and train 
them, but if the demand for this labor wanes then the MC has a new problem, the 
oversupply of labor.  Second, using contractors to complete work is a favorable option 
because once the terms of the contract are complete, those workers leave the MC without 
significant problems.  Third and most favorably, other sections who have excess labor, or 
which are lower on the priority list, shift those people to the new section; often from the 
AAV (Amtrak) or M1A1 Abrams sections.  These workers are then trained and 
incorporated into the new section.   
 As for the effects of additional employees, we expected that they would have also 
slowed down the DLM process.  However, considering that most if not all of the new 
employees in the LAV section came from other departments within the maintenance 
centers, we must consider that any new hires were expected to learn the new TOC system 
as well.  But since the new and old employees would have all been learning the new 
processes together, we suspect that the negative effects of new employees may have had 
less of an impact on LHR’s than they might have if the process was not transforming 
during the same time period. Therefore, it is our finding that although a spike in LHR’s 
was to be expected, at least half of the increase should be attributed to the very new 
process.   
 Once the shocking effects of FY03 concluded, not only would we expect that 
LHR’s would diminish as efficiencies were realized, but also the total number of LAV-
25’s IROAN’d was cut in half, which likewise helps to account for the reduced LHR’s.    
2.   Average LHR Cost  
 At this point, we might expect that the average LHR cost might jump significantly 
as well, considering the many effects on labor during this time period, or that the 
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accumulated effect might be extreme.  But although they did increase from $75 to $88, or 
over 17%, we consider this to be moderate.  The rationale for this can be attributed to 
cost accounting and the spread of overhead across activities.  As the number of LAV-25’s 
receiving DLM doubled in FY03, the distribution of overhead costs affected the overall 
perception of total costs.  This explanation serves us well for FY03, but with the 
significant reduction in LAV-25’s at the depots in FY04 we can no longer extrapolate the 
reasons for the distribution of overhead costs as the dominant factor.  There are obviously 
more factors involved, but these will be analyzed in comparing the two MC’s later.  In 
FY04 as the number of LAV’s serviced was cut in half, we would expect overhead costs 
to be recalculated and reassigned.  However, as we have discussed already the rise in 
average LHR costs were only moderate, even during this time period.  For now, we 
remain impressed that the combined total of a 17% increase in the average cost per labor 
hour is all the depots experienced.  Figure 3 denotes the increase in average labor hour 
cost per LAV-25 over time. 
 












FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05
 
Figure 3.   Average LHR Cost Per LAV-25 
 
3.   Introduction of SLEP and Material Costs 
 The SLEP began a phase-in process in late FY03.  More recently in FY05 we 
began to see some of the SLEP’d vehicles return to the depot for IROAN.  This is proof 
of how rapidly many of the LAV’s are meeting the set requirements for returning to the 
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depot:  6 years, 20K hours, or 25K miles.  The introduction of SLEP to the IROAN 
process currently adds only 1.5 days to the total RCT.  
 There is a marked difference between material costs in FY01-02, prior to the 
incorporation of the SLEP’s with the IROAN’s.  But since SLEP’s were introduced in 
late FY03, we find difficulty in assigning blame to SLEP for the massive increase in 
material costs in FY03 of $40,000 between MCA and MCB, for a combined increase of 
42%.  And then, even more perplexing is the drop in material costs in FY04 by 16%.  
With the introduction of SLEP, we suspected that material costs would rise and stay 
higher, not fluctuate as they have over the last three years.   
 But more profoundly the impact on material costs was due to the increased op-
tempo during FY03 causing extreme stress to many sub-systems of the LAV above and 
beyond normal wear-and-tear, as well as damage to these same systems from operating in 
a severe environment; this is not counting Battle-damaged vehicles.  Additionally, the 
increase in price of repair parts as suppliers rushed to increase production along with their 
prices also serves to explain the increase in material costs.  Looking out an additional 
year, material costs have increased by an average of $30,000, for a combined increase of 
over 27%, but where they will settle in FY06 is anyone’s guess. 
4.   Reduced Repair Cycle Times 
 Another factor must be analyzed though so that it is not assumed that the number 
of labor workers also doubled just because the number of LAV’s IROAN’d doubled.  
This requires an examination of the reduction of RCT’s over the last 5 years.  In FY01 
the average LAV RCT was 231 days, and this was just in the MC and did not count time 
in FSD and all transition times.  Between the budget increases in FY02 due to the War on 
Terror, the expected learning curve, and improvements in the old assembly-line process 
at the MC’s, the RCT dropped to 137 days in FY02.  Ultimately, by FY03 at the time that 
the number of LAV’s going through the IROAN process doubled, there was most likely 
excess labor within the LAV section itself, which helped to absorb the increased 
requirement, and minimize the number of new workers required in the section.  
Additionally, even as the section struggled to adopt the TOC and incorporate the SLEP 
along with the IROAN process, the RCT for FY03 still dropped significantly to 116 days 
average, also helping to dismiss the question of whether a larger adjustment to meet the 
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new higher demand would be necessary.  Currently the average RCT that MCA is 
capable of is 96 days, while it continues to advertise 120 as it maintains its schedules per 
the TOC, but we will elaborate on this distinction in the Repair Cycle Time Analysis 
chapter. 
5.   Total Costs 
 The effect on total costs per vehicle IROAN’d may seem relatively easy to predict 
at this juncture, since we’ve examined both the increase in Material Costs and the 
Average Cost per Labor Hour.  Over the last four years the weighted average cost per 
LAV-25 has increased 29%, from $330K to $427K.  Both labor costs and material costs 
account for this increase, but even though material costs have increased 40% over the last 
four years, material costs only account for 30% of the total cost of an IROAN.  Therefore 
the other 70% of total costs is attributable to labor costs and how and what overhead costs 
are attached to each task.  As we might expect, FY03 saw the most severe increase in 
total costs of nearly $100K per vehicle completed, for over a 29% increase.  While total 
costs settled back down in FY04, FY05 brought the total costs back to the FY03 rates.  
This is also an apparent blow to the TOC and Lean Thinking processes adopted, but as 
we’ll see later there is a profound difference in the financial success of the different 
MC’s.  
        
D.   MCA VERSUS MCB 
 To this point we have been looking at DLM issues collectively.  However, a 
distinction must be made when analyzing cost data between the two MC’s.  Significant 
differences exist in the allocation of costs per task, average cost per labor hour, and in 
material costs.      
1.   Allocation of Costs by Task 
 The cost per task in the DLM process for the LAV at MCA and MCB is listed in 
Appendix A.  As each specific task is performed, costs are assigned to the project based 
on the total hours it takes to complete the task.  The first thing one realizes when 
comparing the costs assigned to the various tasks at the two MC’s is the severe disparity 
between them.  Although the various tasks required in performing an IROAN/SLEP are 
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the same, the allocation of costs, and the description, even within the same task may vary 
somewhat, although the basic premises are the same. 
 A few examples of the differences will suffice.  At MCA the cost of an hour 
working on the Power Train is $66.25, while at MCB the cost is $82.06, or 24% higher.  
The Power Train cost allocation difference is subtle compared to Welding, which at 
MCA is $62.44 and at MCB is $113.09, or 82% higher.  Even a task that requires a basic 
skill level like Painting shows great disparity: $62.44 and $113.09 at MCA and MCB 
respectively, for a difference of 82% as well.  Our data is not reflective of either specific 
costs related to individual labor wages or overhead costs.  However, the combination of 
both is reflected in the massive disparity in the cost allocation structures between the two 
maintenance centers.  Now that we have created a general expectation of what we might 
find when comparing specific metrics, let’s see if our analysis will support our current 
expectations. 
2.   Labor Hours 
 The implementation of the Theory of Constraints spread through both MCA and 
MCB during roughly the same time periods.  Along with the TOC, the shift from the 
assembly-line process to the team/craftsman concept, as well as the implementation of 
the SLEP’s, were all in similar time periods.   
 To reiterate, since MCB performed no IROAN’s on LAV-25’s in FY01, we will 
look at the last four years primarily as we contrast the two depots.  For MCA, the 
moderate increase in LHR’s from FY02-05 was met with a spike in FY03, which was to 
be expected as we have elaborated on above with so many changes and factors above.  
The 160 additional LHR’s over the four years represent only a 5% increase, which we 
consider insignificant considering the additional time required for SLEP, the occasional 
modifications, and the high fluctuations in manpower requirements.  MCB saw a 205 
hour increase over the same period, which represents about a 6% increase.  This increase 
is equally insignificant considering that all of the same factors that applied to MCA also 
applied to MCB, and had similar effects on spikes in LHR’s in FY03 for example.  But 
what is more disconcerting to us is in the comparison of total LHR’s required.  Even in 
FY02 with all of the old processes and budgetary issues, MCA required only 92% of the 
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LHR’s required in MCB.  By the end of FY05, MCA was 9% more efficient than MCB, 
at least with regards to total LHR’s per vehicle.   
 This would not be an insignificant disparity if the cost allocation per task listed 
similar costs between the two MC’s.  However, based on our previous analysis we know 
that this 9% disparity in LHR’s highly exacerbates total labor dollars per vehicle to the 
point of extremes.  In FY02 labor dollars in MCA were about $226K, and discounting the 
spike in FY03, drifted down to $219K by the end of FY05, for a 3% reduction.  
Unfortunately we did not find the same effects at MCB as labor dollars increased from 
$243K to $343K, a 41% increase.  Figure 4 demonstrates the profound disparity in Labor 
Dollars per the two maintenance centers over time. 
  














Figure 4.   Labor Dollar per MC 
 
 Accounting for these disparities is difficult, but along with the disparity in LHR’s, 
the huge disparity in cost allocation, i.e. overhead and labor rates, developed over the last 
four years as well.  The doubling of LAV’s to IROAN in FY03 means that the allocation 
of overhead costs would have been reduced in order to help balance the budget.  
However, the next year in FY04 the number of vehicles serviced was cut in half, but the 
cost allocation structure remained low only at MCA, but not at MCB.  We partially 
attribute this to the success of implementing the TOC and Lean Thinking at MCA 
discussed in the TOC chapter.  FY03 was the year in which both MC’s were severely 
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challenged by the increase in op-tempo and by the transition to the TOC, but it appears at 
this point that MCA is outperforming MCB.  Tables 3 and 4 delineate average total costs 
as well as total costs for the LAV-25 for MCA and MCB respectively. 
    
ALBANY               
FY Labor/HRLabor DollarsAv c LhrMaterial CostCost EA # of LAV'sTotal Cost 
FY01 3,523 283,937 80.60 109,209 393,146 3 1179438
FY02 2,996 226,403 75.57 100,622 327,025 15 4905375
FY03 3,886 296,008 76.17 144,248 440,256 44 19371264
FY04 3,084 221,673 71.88 113,940 335,613 14 4698582
FY05  3,156 219,196 69 147,656 366,852 28 5,487,859
 
Table 3.   MCA Costs FY 01 - 05 
 
BARSTOW               
FY Labor/HRLabor DollarsAve c LhrMaterial CostCost EA # of LAV's Total Cost 
FY01 2,692 176,269 65.48 112,865 289,134 0 0
FY02 3,250 243,474 74.92 89,855 333,329 18 5999922
FY03 3,615 286,255 79.19 125,641 411,896 35 14416360
FY04 3,330 297,786 89.43 114,277 412,063 13 5356819
FY05  3,455 343,967 $99.56 121,529 465,496 45 10,942,272
 
Table 4.   MCB Costs FY 01 – 05 
 
3.   Average LHR Cost 
 It is important to note the successes of the changes at MCA during FY02 as they 
translate into the average cost per labor hour.  Obviously overhead costs are attached to 
each task so that the Working Capital Fund might balance at the end of the fiscal year.  
But a trend has been realized at MCA that can be explained in a few ways.  The trend is 
that average cost per labor hours steadily reduced and is currently $69 per hour, 9% less 
than in FY02.  Even considering the strains and adjustments during FY03, the cost held 
steady from the previous year.  In FY04 when  the annual number of LAV’s IROAN’d is 
cut approximately in half, as it is in Barstow, we expected average LHR cost to increase.  
But regardless of the cost allocation of overhead on the reduced number of vehicles, this 
statistic at MCA reduces by 6% from $76 to $72.  The MC attributes this to the TOC and 
Lean Thinking, and we find it difficult to disagree.  Much of FY03 was spent in refining 
the teamwork practices, craftsman techniques, and other lean practices implemented with 
the TOC.  By FY04 these operations were running even more smoothly, efficiently, and 
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effectively.  Even more amazingly, as the number of LAV’s IROAN’d in FY05 increased 
by 15%, the average LHR cost continued to decline dramatically by over 12%.  This 
statistic alone does much to justify the gains made by TOC and demonstrates not only the 
efficiencies, but also the agility of MCA.   
 It is understandable that average LHR cost would increase during FY03 at both 
MC’s.  They were both transitioning to the TOC, both increasing their workload and 
training new personnel to work on the LAV’s due to the increased budget, and both 
incorporating SLEP into the IROAN process.  But moving on to FY04 and 05 the trend is 
very surprising at MCB.  There, the progress took a different direction altogether.  While 
the RCT’s of both MC’s have continued to decline dramatically over the last five years, 
the dominating cost factor of labor has only decreased at MCA, while it has increased 
dramatically at MCB.  Not only has the average cost per labor hour increased over 33% 
in the last five years, but nearly 26% of that has occurred since adopting the TOC and sits 
at the end of FY05 at $99 per hour.  Figure 5 demonstrates the disparity in average labor 
hour cost over time between the two MC’s.   
 



















4.   Material Costs 
 When it comes to analyzing material costs, the tables are turned a bit on MCA.  
There, costs rose $47K since FY02, or 47%.  As expected, costs shot up in FY03 for 
several reasons already discussed above, and we initially attributed approximately 10% of 
the increase to the SLEP.  But miraculously they dropped back down to $113K each 
during FY04.  Our theory is that because the vehicles IROAN’d at MCA were 
predominantly from units on the east coast which had not yet deployed for OIF, and 
because of the efficiencies gained during FY03, the material costs during FY04 make 
sense.  We do not have information on how many vehicles may have come off of MPS 
ships during FY04 that actively participated in OIF, but we believe the number to be 
either zero or very low.  














Figure 6.   Material Costs per MC 
 
Figure 6 graphs both the similarity in trends as well as the significant disparity in 
material costs per vehicle between the two MC’s.  As for MCB and material costs, the 
effects of time have been less profound.  Although they increased over $31K over four 
years, this is only a 34% increase and much better in relation to MCA.  Additionally their 
FY03 spike was less severe than MCA’s as well, and after FY05 MCB’s material costs 
are $26K less per vehicle, or 18% less.  This is most likely explained by significant cost 
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factors such as transportation costs from suppliers because we do not suspect that MCB 
would be significantly more cost efficient at inventory than MCA.  However, this aspect 
of cost is left for further analysis in a separate project.     
5.   Total Costs 
 The location in which the IROAN is performed had a dramatic impact total cost 
per LAV.  Since FY02, the total cost per LAV-25 has risen from $327K to $367K, or 
12%.  And just as one might expect, FY03 costs spiked at over $440K before dropping 
back down significantly.  However, considering all of the changes over the last four 
years, these numbers seem quite impressive. 
 The situation at MCB is much less impressive though.  The FY02 total each 
rested at $333K, but rose to $465K for FY05, a nearly 40% increase.  While total cost 
each was very compatible in FY02 between the two MC’s, time has not been friendly to 
MCB.  By the end of FY05, not only can MCA perform IROAN/SLEP’s at a lower rate 
than MCB, but this lower rate is massive at a $98K difference.  MCA can perform the 
same tasks for 21% less cost.  Hypothetically, if MCA had serviced the LAV-25’s that 
went to MCB in FY05, approximately $4.5M would have been saved using current rates.  
Figure 7 displays the average total cost per vehicle by maintenance center and clearly 
distinguishes MCA as the cost saver over time. 
  















Figure 7.   Average Total Cost per Vehicle by MC 
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 Based on our analysis of labor costs and material costs, it is basic to see that the 
labor costs have a much greater impact on total cost. Above we demonstrated how 
material costs at MCB have remained significantly lower, $26K lower, than those at 
MCA.  But in the end the total cost is reflective of the massive impact of labor costs 
where we have seen a huge disparity in which MCB pays labor costs at a rate over 57% 
higher than those at MCA.   
 
E.   TRANSPORTATION OF LAV’S 
 Transportation costs have changed dramatically over the last five years.  Although 
the cost of maritime shipping has held steady, the costs of shipping by Tractor Traylor 
(TT) have nearly doubled.  To make matters worse, the variability of cost when shipping 
by TT can be as high as 57%.  However, since movement by TT is significantly less 
expensive than by ship (only because of the lesser distance), this variability has not had 
an extreme impact on budgeting and will therefore be disregarded in our analysis.  We 
will instead focus on average cost of the potential carriers.   
 The one way averages listed in Table 5 show the cost to move an LAV from and 
to the listed origins.  The cost of shipment from Camp Pendleton to Barstow for example 
is rather insignificant in relation to the cost of the entire IROAN process, as is the cost in 
movement from Camp Lejeune to Albany.  Both of these movements have geography on 
their side.  However, the cost of movement across country and across oceans must be 
considered when budgeting for IROAN, since these costs are significant.  In an extreme 
case, a vehicle moving from Okinawa to Barstow and then on to Albany due to either 
under-capacity at Barstow, over-capacity at Albany, or several other reasons, could cost 
nearly $28,000 round trip.  Although this cost is not factored into the total cost of an 
IROAN, it cannot be overlooked that it is approximately 7% of the total current IROAN 
cost.  More likely though, the total transportation cost is only 1-2% of the total cost.  But 
the main point is that transportation costs must be factored into the planning stages by the 
PM’s when considering maximum budget allowances and throughput, especially when 




From To Averages 
Var in Price 
Range 
Camp Pendleton Albany $3,199.37 +- 8% 
Camp Pendleton Barstow $640.54 +-21% 
Camp Lejeune Albany $1,010.81 +-10.5% 
Camp Lejeune Barstow $4,511.07 +-11.5% 
Albany Barstow $3,905.70 +-11.5% 
Pt Hueneme Barstow $685.56 +-29% 
Okinawa Pt Hueneme $9,098.65 +-2% 
Hawaii Pt Hueneme $5,370.09 +-3% 
 
Table 5.   Transportation Costs (Current) 
 
F.   BATTLE DAMAGED LAV’S 
 Although our intent here is not to incorporate battle-damaged LAV’s into our 
previous analysis, it is at least important to address the financial impact that they have on 
the system, and even more important to address the potential influence that they may 
have on cycle-times and the MC’s ability to maintain schedules and the DMFA, which 
will all be addressed in the cycle-time chapter. 
 The total number of LAV’s that have been categorized as battle-damaged since 
the operations in the War on Terror began is 27.  Average cost of repairing an LAV has 
averaged $347K for a total of $9.4M.  However, this does not affect budgets in the MC’s 
since these repairs are paid for by supplementals from the Program Manager in Michigan.  
Detecting trends with regards to these vehicles would be purely speculation, and 
therefore we will refrain from doing so.  However, considering the variation in cost 
associated in repairing these vehicles, we assume that even if a vehicle is due for an 
IROAN or SLEP, or close to its IROAN limits, it will receive service primarily on the 
damage for which it came into DLM.  This is because of restrictions on the use of funds 
for repairing BD vehicles.  But if the BD vehicle is due for the IROAN or SLEP then it 
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V.  REPAIR CYCLE TIMES ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 A tremendous emphasis has been placed on the reduction of Repair Cycle Times 
(RCT) at both MC’s in order to return LAV’s to the operating units as quickly as possible 
and to reduce costs.  The introduction of the Theory of Constraints and Lean Thinking 
have transformed the manner in which the MC’s conduct maintenance and have 
improved operational availability in the operating units as well as improving capacities at 
the MC’s.  For the purposes of this analysis we consider repair cycle times and 
maintenance cycle times as the same. 
1.  Using Unit to Ready for Issue 
 From the operating unit’s perspective the RCT’s begin when they prepare an LAV 
for shipment to a depot and end when they receive a replacement LAV.  The operating 
units don’t see how the MC’s work to reduce RCT’s, they only notice that their LAV’s 
are sent to the depots and are gone for months.  The operating units are using the correct 
interpretation of RCT’s.  The entire time an LAV is away from the operating unit should 
be considered the RCT because every step from preparing the LAV for shipment at the 
unit, to shipment, to awaiting maintenance at the FSD, to induction at either MC, back to 
the FSD awaiting shipment, to return shipment, and finally returned to an operating unit 
is all part of the RCT.  It does not do a lot of good to only reduce RCT’s at one point in 
the chain and ignore the cycle times everywhere else.   
 Our analysis uncovered that, although there is an emphasis on maintenance 
processes and RCT’s at the MC’s, there is no accounting for time anywhere else along 
the chain of events that encompass depot level maintenance of LAV’s.  This is due 
partially to misconceptions about what an RCT actually is and a chain of custody during 
the entire process that changes hands several times, with each custodian concerned only 
about their own responsibilities and not the big picture maintenance cycle time. 
B. MAINTENANCE STEPS  
 For the purpose of our analysis we asked MCA to give us the Work Order 
Routing lists for two recently completed IROAN LAV-25’s; one a baseline (without 
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SLEP upgrades) to SLEP and the second an A1 (SLEP upgrades completed previous 
IROAN cycle).  We then built two tables to compare the difference in processes between 
the two LAV-25’s.  Appendix D provides the compiled results from the baseline to SLEP 
LAV-25 and illustrates the 38 maintenance steps and 409 total maintenance hours to 
complete the IROAN and SLEP upgrades for this particular LAV-25.  Appendix E 
provides the compiled results from the A1 LAV-25 that was completed the same month 
as our baseline LAV-25 and illustrates 36 maintenance steps and 380 total maintenance 
hours to complete an IROAN that has already had the SLEP upgrades completed.  The 
maintenance hours are only the hours necessary to complete the task, not the man-hours.   
1.  SLEP Maintenance Additions 
 Both Appendix D & E indicate that there is very little difference between the two 
maintenance processes, since both use the IROAN as the standard process. The only 
differences are the SLEP upgrades, which are the additions of steps 16 and 17 in 
Appendix E, adding 25 hours to the process and an additional 3 hours in administration in 
step 38.  The remainders of the maintenance steps are the same between the two LAV’s. 
The LAV Program Lead in MCA stated that there is normally an additional 10 hours 
during the hull repair to install SLEP bosses, standoffs, and brackets.  An additional 4-5 
hours are required for electrical modifications, and the remainder of the SLEP upgrades 
are done during the reassembly process with no additional hours because the mechanics 
would have been installing the old baseline components as opposed to the provided SLEP 
components. 
2.  Hull Maintenance Factors 
 The hull repair in step 11 of both Appendix D & E indicates that 100 hours was 
spent on this critical maintenance step for both LAV’s.  The ability of the armor to 
withstand an Improvised Explosive Devise (IED) is critical to the survivability of the 
LAV and crew so it is not surprising that approximately 25% of the entire maintenance 
hours are spent on repairing the hull.  It is also the step where the most variability exists.  
If the hull has little damage and requires fewer repairs it will greatly reduce the RCT on 
that particular LAV.  The MC also spends 45 hours in various inspections, indicating that 
quality is a priority.   
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C. RCT REDUCTION SINCE FY 01 
 The MC’s have invested considerable capital and time in an attempt to reduce 
RCT’s.  The introduction of the TOC occurred during the latter part of FY01 and as 
shown later in figure – 8, the average RCT at the MC in Albany dropped significantly in 
FY02 from 231 days to 137 days, which is a reduction of 40% in a matter of months.  It is 
obvious that the MC was not very efficient prior to the introduction of the TOC and even 
a steep learning curve did not affect a rapid improvement in RCT’s.  No new 
maintenance processes were added, or deleted, in FY01 or FY02.  The MC was still 
doing the same IROAN and the reduction in RCT’s can be fully attributed to the 
introduction of the TOC. 
1.  RCT at MCA 
 The MC in Albany has noticed an improvement every year since the introduction 
of the TOC, indicating the RCT’s are gradually going down as the MC becomes more 
adept at implementing the TOC.  The average RCT’s were reduced 21 days from FY02 to 
FY03, a 15% reduction, and in FY04 there was a further reduction of 9 days, or 7%,  and 
another reduction in  FY05 of 19% to 96 days of actual RCT.  Even the introduction of 
the SLEP during the last quarter of FY01 did not slow the reduction of the RCT’s down 
very much, indicating that the MC is very efficient and flexible in handling new tasks and 
that the TOC is working well.  The MC in Albany has estimated that improved 
efficiencies have given them the additional funds and capacity to process 6 additional 
LAV-25’s through the MC. 
2.  Capacity 
 In FY03 there was a surge in capacity at the MC in Albany due to Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.  There were 55 LAV-25’s repaired at the MC in FY03, including battle 
damaged vehicles, as opposed to 15 in FY02 showing a 266% surge in capacity from 
FY02 to FY03.  The surge in FY03 of LAV-25’s repaired at the MC was typical for all 
the variants, indicating that the MC was able to efficiently handle the capacity and still 
reduce average RCT’s by 9% from FY03 to FY04.  The manner in which the MC 
handled the surge of LAV’s inducted for maintenance in FY03 also gives us an idea 
about overall capacity.  The LAV Project Lead in Albany stated that the MC could handle 
all of the LAV depot maintenance, without additional facilities, and still maintain low 
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RCT’s.  There was a inflow of funds to support the maintenance costs in FY03 to present 
and it is difficult to assess what the impact of those additional funds is concerning RCT’s.  
If those funds are reduced it is very probable that the MC’s would become less efficient 
and the RCT’s would begin to go up.  There is a direct correlation between funds and 
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Figure 8.   MC Albany Average Repair Cycle Times FY01 - FY05 
 
D. COMPARING RCT’S AT ALBANY AND BARSTOW 
 Both MC’s at Albany and Barstow advertise current RCT’s of 120 days for the 
LAV-25.  Actual average RCT’s in Albany are 96 days, but Barstow uses the full 120 to 
complete depot maintenance.  Part of this may be due to Albany doing a better job of 
implementing the TOC and Lean Thinking, but Barstow processes more LAV’s through 
depot maintenance than does Albany, the exception being FY03.  Other factors that may 
effect RCT differences between the two MC’s are a larger work force in Albany to draw 
from and Albany is co-located with it’s parent command LOGCOM, giving it more 
visibility. 
1.  Battle Damaged LAV’s 
 Battle damaged LAV-25’s are averaging 119 day RCT’s at the MC in Albany, 
only 23 days more than a scheduled IROAN vehicle.  Both MC’s are repairing battle 
damaged LAV’s with approximately the same RCT’s, but we were unable to obtain data 
from Barstow to compare the two MC’s directly. 
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E. CALCULATING OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY AND MTBM 
 Calculating operational availability (Ao) for the LAV-25 can lead to much 
confusion.  Therefore, it is imperative that the numbers, which our Ao represents be well 
defined.  Considering the extremely high operational tempo that the LAV’s are currently 
maintaining in support of OIF, it is to be expected that Ao might suffer.  However, these 
low Ao’s are not truly representative of the situation with these vehicles.  An examination 
of the LM2 Readiness database as displayed in the Marine Corps Equipment Readiness 
Information Tool (MERIT) will help us to explore these issues.   
1.  LAV Distribution 
 Historically, the readiness database would have provided information on only six 
primary major units: I, II, and III MEF, Reserves, Base Units, and MPS’s.  More recently, 
a seventh major unit was added in order to provide for greater equipment accountability 
in the form of a “Deployed RUC” that became part of the Marine Corps concept in which 
deploying units would “fall” onto some of the same equipment used by the units being 
replaced.  This unit is the VII MEF.  The major problem with building this account in the 
SASSY system is that although the Marine Corps established an “Authorized SASSY” 
quantity for the VII MEF account, it did not reduce the Authorized SASSY accounts of 
the major units from which these LAV’s were redistributed from.  This is likely due to 
the expectation that doing so would create confusion in the future when this equipment 
returns to the primary using units stateside.  In the meantime, defining and advertising 
specific Ao’s must be met with skepticism and a basic understanding of the above. 
2.  Defining Operational Availability Parameters 
 We will now define the parameters we used in calculating Ao’s per the 18 
November 2005 MERIT Report, our estimates of Maintenance Down-time (MDT), and 
the current Safety Stock (SS).  Remember that there is an expectation of a one-for-one 
swap from the DFMA when using units send LAV’s to DLM.  Additionally, we consider 
the Safety Stock to include the vehicles in the DFMA as well as those in other delay time 
statuses.  Ultimately, SS will be the difference between all existing LAV-25’s and the 
current Authorized quantity listed in MERIT, less the VII MEF account. 
 In estimating MDT, we had to consider several time factors, which included 
transportation time from the using unit to the depot, the time spent in FSD both before 
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and after receiving service in the maintenance center, and finally the RCT within the MC 
itself.  Because the variation in transit times is rather extreme, ranging from 2 days to 
potentially a few months for an LAV returning from Iraq via an MPS, we decided to use 
an extreme but known transit time from Kaneohe, HI and Okinawa, Japan of 50 days for 
the transit time.   
Transit  FSD MC Total MDT   MTBM MDT Ao Safety Stock 
50 30 120 200 6.58  24 6.58 0.78 86.03
 
Table 6.   6 Process Times and Operational Availability 
 
 As for time spent in the FSD receiving preparation for service in the MC, we had 
to consider many factors.  For one thing, our attempts at retrieving data pertaining to time 
spent in the FSD were ultimately fruitless.  However, considering the comments made by 
employees at MCA whom we consider experts, we estimated delay times in FSD to be at 
a minimum somewhere between two and six weeks.  Based on this we took the average 
and used 30 days for our calculation.  Once the LAV has had its required items 
reinstalled at the FSD after receiving DLM, it is again Ready for Issue (RFI), and it is at 
this point that our time stops.  Lastly, regardless of the potential RCT of 96 days for the 
LAV-25 at MCA, we were compelled to use the advertised RCT of 120 days.  These 
three major factors add up to a total of 200 days of MDT, or 6.58 months.    
3.  MTBM and Operational Availability Determination 
 The other major variable in calculating Ao is Mean Time Between Maintenance 
(MTBM).  Although we know the three primary milestones that qualify an LAV for 
DLM, i.e. 6yrs., 2K operating hours, or 25K miles, we do not have data delineating which 
of these factors dominates.  Therefore, we determined to estimate current MTBM based 
on other known factors by working our formulas backwards.   
 Since we know that 398 LAV-25’s exist in the Marine Corps, and that 314 are 
authorized assignment to either operating units or MPS’s, we subtracted the difference 
between these totals to determine the planned Safety Stock of 84 vehicles.  Next, we were 
able to Solve for the expected Ao that would require approximately 84 vehicles.  This 
expected Ao was determined to be .79.  And now with the expected Ao known, we could 
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Solve for the current MTBM since we already calculated the MDT.  Therefore, using the 
current SS and the estimated MDT, we estimate the MTBM to be 24 months.   
 This 24 months is a best-case scenario, but as we have alluded to in the previous 
chapters, the current rate at which LAV-25’s are IROAN’d is not sufficient to meet the 
requirements of the current operating tempo.  Additionally, what we truly suspect, but 
cannot prove to be the case at this time, is that the current MDT is much greater than 6.58 
months, and maybe as high as 9 months.  Holding the SS constant, we must adjust the 
MTBM out to 37 months (a more favorable estimate), which also holds the Ao constant 
at .79.   
 In reality we would like for this to be the case, but as of yet we have not 
considered deficiencies within operating units themselves.  Although 314 is the current 
SASSY Authorized quantity, the actual possessed quantity is only 280.  Translation being 
that although the expected Marine Corps wide Ao for LAV-25’s is .79, the actual Ao is 
only .71.  More profoundly, this lowers the current MTBM requirement even further to 
16 months, with a required SS increase to 118 LAV-25’s to round out the calculations 
accordingly.  Whether current capacity is capable of IROAN/SLEP at this rate is equally 
as important as the exceptionally high cost of maintaining LAV’s at this rate, but capacity 
is addressed elsewhere.  For now the concern is that the system is strained somewhere, 
which is creating difficulties in keeping Possessed quantities equal to Authorized 
quantities.   
 The short answers for increasing Ao and reducing our T/E deficiencies are many, 
and some more practical than others.  For example, we know that a majority of the 
LAV’s require less than 8 days to travel from the using unit to the depot.  Plugging this 
value into our formula not only reduces MDT by 20%, but increases Ao by .03 and 
reduces the required SS to 68 from 84.  More realistically, a concerted effort to push 
vehicles through the FSD and to sustain the potential RCT of 96 would reduce MDT by 
15%, increase Ao by .025, and reduce the number of LAV-25’s out of the hands of using 
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VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Our analysis has demonstrated the merits of the Theory of Constraints and Lean 
Thinking, at least when they are properly applied, when personnel are well trained, and 
when overhead and labor costs are not crippling factors in total cost structure  of the 
maintenance center.  The total costs spent on IROAN/SLEP at the respective MC’s gives 
us the profound picture of the present and future of finances at MCA and MCB.  We have 
demonstrated how the weighted average of the total costs spent on these programs at the 
two depots is $8.3M.  However, we have also contrasted the two maintenance centers and 
shown that the total costs for the LAV-25 at MCA in FY05 are only $5.5M, while total 
cost at MCB neared $11M, and MCB only serviced four more vehicles than did MCA.   
A.   CONCLUSIONS 
1.   General 
 Our analysis has displayed the variations in the effects of major changes at the 
two Marine Corps MC’s even as they implemented the various programs simultaneously.  
We have seen the implementation of the Theory of Constraints and Lean Thinking, and 
have delved into the potential savings that these programs helped to create as we 
analyzed the maintenance center at Albany.  However, we have also seen that a program 
in itself is obviously not enough to effect positive change and efficiencies over time, as 
we have analyzed the maintenance center at Barstow.  
 We have also concluded that although the cost of materials has risen over time, 
this has been of little impact in the total cost of an IROAN/SLEP, and therefore we are 
not highly concerned with material costs.  However, the disparity in material costs 
between the two depots is significant.   
 Most profoundly we have determined labor costs to be over 70% of the cost of 
performing IROAN/SLEP’s, and we have delineated the effects of stable average LHR 
costs and overhead costs on the total cost of a vehicle at MCA, and we have likewise 
delineated the effects of a cost allocation system that severely increases total labor costs 
and total costs at MCB.  Unfortunately from our perspective, not nearly as much attention 
has been paid to properly implementing TOC and Lean Thinking concepts at MCB as 
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was done at MCA.  In the end, the realities of DoD budget constraints will come to affect 
how and where the Marine Corps focuses its DLM processes.   
2.   In Line with BRAC 
 Although we were somewhat aware of the BRAC Commission’s plans to realign 
certain organizations in Barstow, and to shift certain maintenance efforts to depots other 
than Barstow, we intentionally did not study the Commission’s findings until our analysis 
was complete in order to remain more objective.  We have now found that our findings 
are in line with the Commission’s observations of MCB and its recommendations as well. 
 We will not consider all of the SECDEF’s recommendations, but those that are 
pertinent in relation to MCA require addressing.  It was recommended that a 
consolidation of depot maintenance of conventional weapons, engines/transmissions, 
material handling, powertrain components, starter/alternators/generators, TMDE, and 
wire be conducted at Albany.  Especially with regards to the sub-process of performing 
DLM on the engines and transmissions of the LAV at MCA, the cost savings should be 
significant since these have been and will remain core competencies at MCA, and the 
efficiencies gained in these processes have been displayed in terms of cost and cycle-
times.  The Commission expected to reduce the cost of DLM operation across DoD 
through consolidation and elimination of 30 percent of duplicate overhead structures 
required to operate multiple DLM activities.  They planned to increase the use of existing 
capacity while maintaining capability to support future force structure.  The Commission 
rejected Barstow’s claims that cycle-times and quality of work would be affected. 
 
B.   RECOMMENDATIONS 
1.   Conduct Further Analysis of Cost Allocation Disparity between MCA 
and MCB 
 Our research demonstrates how the cost allocation system contrasts wildly 
between the two depots.  Depending on the specific task, the same task can be between 
24% and 82% more expensive at MCB than at MCA.  We have also delineated the effects 
of these labor costs on total costs, since labor is 70% of the driver in total costs.  The  
nearly $100K in excess costs at MCB has had a tremendous impact on bottom lines, and 
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amazingly over eight LAV-25’s could have been IROAN/SLEP’d at MCA with the 
$4.5M in additional funds spent at MCB. 
 We recommend that further studies be conducted to determine the extent of 
overhead costs attached to specific tasks at both MCA and MCB, as well as of the costs 
and impact of direct labor both currently and long term on the maintenance centers.  We 
consider the fact that these cost allocations are not standardized between the only two 
logistics depots in the Marine Corps to be an extreme oversight.  Putting costs in parallel 
will allow higher level civilian and military managers, as well as future BRAC 
Commissions, to better compare progress and efficiencies at both depots. 
2.   Conduct Further Analysis of Disparity in Material Costs between 
MCA and MCB 
 Our research has demonstrated some significant disparities in material costs 
between the two maintenance centers.  Although material costs have risen moderately at 
MCB, they have risen more severely at MCA.  In fact, they have risen nearly 50% there.  
We explored the possibility that the introduction of the SLEP program may have severely 
impacted material costs, but have determined that only a small portion of this increase is 
attributable to SLEP.  Therefore, much of this increase is unaccounted for. 
 We recommend that further studies be conducted to determine the source of such 
high costs for materials at MCA in relation to MCB.  We are not convinced that 
transportation costs account for more than some of the increase.  We suspect that more 
likely the per unit cost of materials may have risen in response to the implementation of 
Lean Thinking concepts in which the MC’s have attempted to reduce inventories.  
However, we are not certain of this and would like to see more detailed analysis of 
material cost increases over time and the disparities between the two MC’s.   
3.   MC’s Should Better Track Individual Vehicle Statistics Pertaining to 
Total Cycle-Time 
 Within the cycle-time chapter we demonstrated the process through which we 
estimated certain aspects of the total cycle-time.  While the maintenance centers seem to 
“live and die” by their advertised RCT’s, the FSD appear to not even track the length of 
time vehicles spend in their care.  Total Turn-around-time (TAT) may not be as important 
to an LAR Battalion since LAV’s have a DMFA program, but since we’ve shown the 
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negative affects of high transit and FSD processing times, as well as of high operational 
tempo on MTBM, total cycle-time matters even more now than it ever has.  The 24 
month MTBM has shown us that the current rate of IROAN’s is more than insufficient in 
meeting the requirements of the current operating tempo.   
 It is therefore imperative that the FSD’s begin to track and publish the time spent 
in their care so that the effects of this potentially high time period can be further analyzed 
























APPENDIX A.  LABOR COST ALLOCATION AT MAINTENANCE 
CENTER ALBANY 
 
    $66.25 603 QA/QC CONFIG DATA 
   $48.47 611 ENGINEERING DEPT 
$48.47 616 INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING 
$41.72 621 MATERIAL MANAGEMENT 
$41.72 622 SFC TMDE/ELECTRONICS 
$41.72 623 SFC HEAVY MOBILE 
$41.72 624 SFC MPTS 
$41.72 625 INVENTORY MANAGEMENT 
$41.72 626 MATERIAL HANDLING (MHE)
$66.25 640 PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 
$66.25 711 ENGINES 
$66.25 712 POWER TRAIN 
$66.25 713 HMMWV 
$66.25 714 5-TON 
$66.25 715 M88 
$66.25 716 LVS 
$66.25 717 ENG/CONSTRUCTION 
$66.25 721 ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
$66.25 722 ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
$66.25 723 AAV 
$66.25 724 LAV 
$66.25 725 M1A1 
$66.25 726 HYDRAULICS/MISC 
$66.25 727 MECHANICAL COMPONENTS
$66.25 728 OPTIS COMPONENTS 
$66.25 729 SMALL ARMS 
$62.44 740 MPST 
$62.44 741 MACHINE 
$62.44 742 SHEET METAL 
$62.44 743 WELDING 
$62.44 744 BODY SHOP HEAVY 
$62.44 745 CLEAN/BLAST 
$62.44 746 PRESERVATION 
$62.44 747 BODY SHOP HEAVY 
$62.44 749 PAINT 
$77.43 730 ELECTRONIC 
$77.43 731 ATEP SUPPORT 
$77.43 732 ELECTRONIC CALB 
$77.43 733 MECHANICAL CALB 
$77.43 734 COMM/ELEC EQUIP 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 51
APPENDIX B. LABOR COST ALLOCATION AT MAINTENANCE 
CENTER BARSTOW 
$62.67 616 PROCESS ENGRNG 
$58.19 602 PROJECT MANAGER 
$58.19 607 MASTER SCHEDULING 
$58.19 620 QUALITY ANALYSIS 
$58.19 622 M.C.C. 
$58.19 623 MATERIAL MANAGEMENT 
$58.19 624 INVENTORY MANAGEMENT 
$104.61 681 ELEC CAL/RADIAC 
$104.61 684 PHYSCIAL DIMENSION/CAL 
$104.61 685 LASER/ELECTRO OPTICS 
$104.61 686 TMDE 
$104.61 687 NIGHT SIGHTS 
$104.61 688 WEAPON SYSTEMS 
$82.06 710 HEAVY MOBILE EQUIPMENT B.C.
$82.06 711 MOTOR ROOM 
$82.06 713 HMMWV/LAV/SEE/Radiator 
$82.06 714 TRKS/LVS/CRANES/FORKLIFTS 
$82.06 719 PAXMAN/TIRE 
$82.06 721 TRANSMISSION/POWERTRAIN 
$82.06 723 AAV HULLS 
$82.06 725 M1A1/M88/DOZER/M9ACE/AVLB 
$82.06 726 HYDRAULICS/FIRE SUSPENSION
$82.06 727 AAV COMPONENTS 
$82.06 728 ELECTRO-OPTICS 
$82.06 729 TURRET/ARTILLERY 
$104.61 730 COMM/ELECT B. C. 
$104.61 731 ELECT/AC/GEN/BATTERY 
$104.61 732 GROUND COM 
$104.61 733 MTDS 
$104.61 734 HAWK/ATE 
$104.61 735 RADAR 
$104.61 737 LAUNCHER 
$113.09 740 SUPPORT B. C. 
$113.09 741 MACHINE SUPPORT 
$113.09 742 SHEET METAL AND BODY SHOP
$113.09 743 WELDING & NDT 
$113.09 744 UNDERCOAT/LUBE 
$113.09 745 MATERIAL HANDLING (MHE) 
$113.09 746 STEAM/BLAST 
$113.09 748 CLEAN/PAINT/LATE/CANVAS 
$113.09 749 PAINT, FINAL 














































APPENDIX C. MERIT – LAV DISTRIBUTION BY MAJOR 
SUBORDINATE COMMAND 
MEF AUTH POSS EXCESS DEF D/L
I MEF Camp Pendleton, CA  52 8 0 44 6
I MEF Camp Pendleton, CA  46 34 0 12 7
I MEF Camp Pendleton, CA  4 4 0 0 0
II MEF Camp Lejeune, NC  56 35 0 21 6
II MEF Camp Lejeune, NC  4 4 0 0 0
III MEF Okinawa, JP  8 8 0 0 1
III MEF Okinawa, JP  6 6 0 0 0
IV Reserves  60 60 0 0 16
Prepositioned 
(MPS/NALMEB)  7 7 0 0 0
Prepositioned 
(MPS/NALMEB)  7 7 0 0 0
Prepositioned 
(MPS/NALMEB)  7 7 0 0 0
Prepositioned 
(MPS/NALMEB)  7 7 0 0 0
Prepositioned 
(MPS/NALMEB)  7 7 0 0 0
Prepositioned 
(MPS/NALMEB)  7 7 0 0 0
VII MEF  2 2 0 0 0
VII MEF  0 13 13 0 6
VII MEF  41 15 0 26 1
VII MEF  0 13 13 0 0
Bases Posts and Stations  21 21 0 0 3
Bases Posts and Stations  15 15 0 0 2
GRAND TOTAL 357 280 26 103 48









































APPENDIX D.  BASELINE IROAN TO SLEP MAINTENANCE  
Step Maintenance Process Hours 
1. Conduct a joint Limited Technical Inspection (LTI) with MC and FSD.      3 
2. Remove the main gun. 1 
3. Drain all petroleum, oils and lubricants. 5 
4. Disassemble LAV to include turret, engine, transmission, and components. 22 
5. Remove vision blocks and periscope retainers. 1 
6. Remove communications gear. 1 
7. Inspection of components. 1 
8. Hull steam clean. 4 
9. Hull blast (inside and out down to metal) 20 
10. Hull NDT crack inspection. (concentrate on strut caps and shock towers, exhaust outlet, vision blocks, tow pintle, 
hatches, doors, grill, and tow eye). 
5 
11. Hull Repair.  If no defects are found go to step 12 then continue from 17. 100 
12. Machinist repairs (damaged bolts, bosses). 1 
13. Preliminary radiographic inspection. 1 
14. Hull NDT inspection (from previous welding). 18 
15. Correct hull defects. 1 
16. Support weld shop. 1 
17. SLEP upgrade application. 24 
18. Hull spot blast and blow down.   10 
19. Hull prime and paint. 12 
20. Install electrical cable set #1. 1 
21. Level 1 assembly (brake lines, air system, differential vent lines, winch, hydraulic components and lines, and NBC 
system). 
20 
22. Install electrical cable set #2. 1 
23. Level 2 assembly (SLEP upgrade kits) 27 
24. Level 3 assembly (install suspension, steering bearings, linkages, and gears). 21 
25. Level 4 assembly (install heater, fuel tank and lines, seats, fire suppression system, floor plates, and test brake 
pressure and fuel pump). 
29 
26. Terminate engine cables and test. 1 
27. Level 5 assembly (install pack, fan tower and grills, turret, hatch seals, wheel assembly and align). 20 
28. Level 6 yellow tag (test propeller drive units, road test, and water test). 8 
29. Install main gun. 2 
30. Final clean (steam). 3 
31. Final paint (prep, base coat, apply camo paint, touch up). 17 
32. Install communications equipment and test including turret stabilization. 10 
33. Optics installation and test. 10 
34. Final small arms installation and inspection. 2 
35. Final turret inspection. 1 
36. Level 7 green tag quality assurance inspection. 11 
37. Final acceptance inspection. 2 
38. Administration. 4 








































APPENDIX E.  A1 IROAN MAINTENANCE PROCESSES (SLEP 
UPGRADES INPLACE) 
Step Maintenance Process Hours 
1. Conduct a joint Limited Technical Inspection (LTI) with MC and FSD.      3 
2. Remove the main gun. 1 
3. Drain all petroleum, oils and lubricants. 5 
4. Disassemble LAV to include turret, engine, transmission, and components. 22 
5. Remove vision blocks and periscope retainers. 1 
6. Remove communications gear. 1 
7. Inspection of components. 1 
8. Hull steam clean. 4 
9. Hull blast (inside and out down to metal) 20 
10. Hull NDT crack inspection. (concentrate on strut caps and shock towers, exhaust outlet, vision blocks, tow pintle, 
hatches, doors, grill, and tow eye). 
5 
11. Hull Repair.  If no defects are found go to step 12 then continue from 17. 100 
12. Machinist repairs (damaged bolts, bosses). 1 
13. Preliminary radiographic inspection. 1 
14. Hull NDT inspection (from previous welding). 18 
15. Correct hull defects. 1 
16. Hull spot blast and blow down.   10 
17. Hull prime and paint. 12 
18. Install electrical cable set #1. 1 
19. Level 1 assembly (brake lines, air system, differential vent lines, winch, hydraulic components and lines, and NBC 
system). 
20 
20. Install electrical cable set #2. 1 
21. Level 2 assembly (install transfer and differential) 27 
22. Level 3 assembly (install suspension, steering bearings, linkages, and gears). 21 
23. Level 4 assembly (install heater, fuel tank and lines, seats, fire suppression system, floor plates, and test brake 
pressure and fuel pump). 
29 
24. Terminate engine cables and test. 1 
25. Level 5 assembly (install pack, fan tower and grills, turret, hatch seals, wheel assembly and align). 20 
26. Level 6 yellow tag (test propeller drive units, road test, and water test). 8 
27. Install main gun. 2 
28. Final clean (steam). 3 
29. Final paint (prep, base coat, apply camo paint, touch up). 17 
30. Install communications equipment and test including turret stabilization. 10 
31. Optics installation and test. 10 
32. Final small arms installation and inspection. 2 
33. Final turret inspection. 1 
34. Level 7 green tag quality assurance inspection. 11 
35. Final acceptance inspection. 2 
36. Administration. 1 
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